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ARTICLES
ACCOMMODATING PREGNANCY IN THE
WORKPLACE
Deborah A. Calloway*
I. SCOPE
A woman who becomes pregnant may be unable to work
throughout her pregnancy and unable to return to work after deliv-
ering her child unless she is provided with workplace accommoda-
tions designed to permit her to perform and keep her job, including,
for example, light duty, flexible schedules, and disability leave.
Pregnant women who work in jobs requiring exposure to workplace
hazards, such as toxic fumes and disease, may require accommoda-
tions to avoid endangering the developing fetus.1 Litigation under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 has produced mixed
opinions concerning a woman's right to workplace accommodations
to permit her to continue working and protect her fetus.' Congress
recently enacted three statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),3 the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),5 which collectively raise new questions
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Pregnant workers also need medical benefits. The right to accommodation ad-
dressed in this Article does not reach medical benefits.
2. See infra part III.
3. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
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about the meaning and application of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 (PDA).' The ADA applies a concept of equal employ-
ment opportunity based on an affirmative obligation to accommo-
date differences, a marked change from the requirement of equal
treatment of similarly situated individuals central to all prior anti-
discrimination statutes.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Congress recognized the judi-
cially created concept of disparate impact discrimination, a concept
which, although grounded in equal treatment principles, provides a
mechanism for ensuring equal employment opportunity to employ-
ees who are not similarly situated. Finally, the FMLA imposes an
affhmative obligation to promote employment opportunities by
mandating benefits to specified classes of employees whose require-
ments differ from the employee population as a whole.
Although none of these statutes expressly requires employers
to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace, all three adopt ap-
proaches designed to force employers to accommodate differences.
All three are likely to influence future interpretations of the PDA.
This Article concerns the relationship between these three statutes
and the PDA with respect to employers' obligations to accommodate
pregnancy in the workplace.
The arguments presented in this Article supporting a legal
obligation to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace are based on
statutes that focus on the rights of female employees. From a policy
perspective, however, this Article takes the position that accommo-
dating pregnancy should not be viewed as a right belonging to par-
ents. Rather, it should be characterized as a legal obligation to
promote the health of developing children. Statutes dealing directly
with fetal health in the workplace would provide a more appropri-
ate basis for imposing this obligation.' Nonetheless, because the
(Supp. V 1993)).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
7. Some state statutes impose a specific obligation to accommodate pregnancy. For
example, California defines "unlawful employment practice" to include:
[refusing] to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to a less strenu-
ous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests,
with the advice of her physician, where that transfer can be reasonably accom-
modated .... However,. . . no employer shall be required by this section to
create additional employment.., the employer would not otherwise have cre-
ated, nor shall the employer be required to discharge any employee, transfer
any employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is not quali-
fied to perform the job.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(c)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Similarly, Connecticut defines
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problem is acute and the likelihood of a new statutory scheme re-
mote, this Article provides an approach to protecting developing
children that uses existing anti-discrimination statutes.
II. THE NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION
A. Accommodations Necessary to Permit Pregnant Employees to
Perform Job Functions and Comply with Work Rules without
Compromising Their Health
Pregnancy restricts a woman's ability to perform work tasks
and comply with work rules. In addition, some jobs create health
hazards for pregnant women.
First, with respect to a pregnant woman's ability to perform job
functions, the physical changes caused by pregnancy interfere with
a pregnant woman's ability to perform physical work. Relaxin, one
of the hormones produced during pregnancy, causes ligaments to
soften and stretch. The purpose of the hormone is to loosen-up the
pelvic structure to accommodate the growing fetus and to permit
delivery of the fetus. Unfortunately, the hormone also relaxes other
ligaments, including those in the neck, shoulder, elbow, knees, and
back. The laxity of a pregnant woman's ligaments shifts the burden
of supporting her joints to her muscles, causing muscle fatigue,
reduced strength and creating a heightened risk of injury, particu-
larly to her lower back during the fifth to seventh month of preg-
nancy.8
"discriminatory practice" to include: Refusing to grant a pregnant employee a reasonable
leave of absence; refusing to reinstate a pregnant employee to her original job or an
equivalent position after pregnancy leave, and failing or refusing
to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable
temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee
gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or
pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the posi-
tion held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7)(E) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995). Louisiana also
provides a right to reasonable leave and makes it an unlawful employment practice
[flor any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee
to a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if
she so requests,... where such transfer can be reasonably accommodated,
provided however, that no employer shall be required by this Section to create
additional employment which the employer would not otherwise have created,
nor shall such employer be required to discharge any employee, transfer any
employee with more seniority, or promote any employee . . who is not quali-
fied to perform the job.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1008(A)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
8. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc.
1995]
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A pregnant woman's physical abilities also are compromised by
her increased size and weight. Her growing body stretches and
weakens her abdominal muscles as well as imposing stress on the
already weakened joints and muscles of her back.9 The redistribu-
tion of her body mass displaces her center of gravity forward, inter-
fering with her balance and equilibrium.0
As a result of these physical changes, women in the later stag-
es of pregnancy may be unable to perform job tasks involving repet-
itive (more than four times in an eight-hour shift) climbing of lad-
ders or poles or even stairs as early as the twentieth to twenty-
eighth week of pregnancy. Intermittent climbing (less than four
times in an eight-hour shift) may be restricted beginning with the
twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. In addition, jobs requiring lifting
sometimes become difficult or impossible as the pregnancy pro-
gresses." Similarly, during the third trimester, pregnant women
may have difficulty reaching high shelves or cleaning windows due
to impaired equilibrium.' Loss of balance, loose joints, and re-
duced muscle strength also make running difficult. The National
Institute of Safety and Health, however, in Guidelines on Pregnan-
cy and Work, a booklet prepared by the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, cautions that generalizations about the
physical capabilities of pregnant women are dangerous:
Tolerance of strenuous exertion, such as lifting, pulling, push-
ing or climbing, will vary widely, depending on differences in the
& WELFARE, PUB. No. 78-118, AMERIcAN COLLEGE OF OBST. AND GYN., GUIDELINES ON
PREGNANCY AND WORK 3, 18 (1977) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK];
Wendy Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work, in DOUBLE
EXPOSURE 197 (Wendy Chavkin ed., 1984) [hereinafter Walking a Tightrope]; Wendy
Chavkin, Work and Pregnancy: Review of the Literature and Policy Discussion, 41 OBST.
& GYN. SURvEY 467, 469 (1986) [hereinafter Work and Pregnancy]; JA. Paul et al., Work
Load and Musculoskeletal Complaints During Pregnancy, 20 SCAND. J. WORK ENVT
HEALTH 153, 153-59 (1994).
9. Paul et al., supra note 8, at 156.
10. Id.; see also GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, supra note 8, at 34.
11. Council on Scientific Affairs, Effects of Pregnancy on Work Performance, 251
JAMA 1995, 1996 (1984). This report suggests that women 20 weeks pregnant should
not work at jobs involving repetitive lifting of weights over 23 kilograms. At 24 weeks,
repetitive lifting of weights over 11 kilograms is not recommended. At 30 weeks, inter-
mittent lifting of weights over 23 kilograms should be restricted, and at 40 weeks, a
pregnant woman should not be working at a job involving repetitive lifting of any
amount, although she still can safely lift weights less than 14 kilograms on an intermit-
tent basis. Id.; see Work and Pregnancy, supra note 8, 469.
12. Paul et al., supra note 8, at 156.
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woman's physical fitness and strength, the load handled, and the
environment. The pregnant woman may be small, large, strong,
weak. Her strength, balance, agility, and internal burdens change
from month to month.
Packages or loads also vary widely in size, shape, and consis-
tency, from a bale of towels to a case of goods, or a patient in a
nursing home.13
Nonetheless, pregnancy for many women restricts their ability
to climb ladders, poles, scaffolding, and stairs; lift or move heavy
objects; run or walk quickly; or stretch to reach things. During
pregnancy, especially during the later stages, women may be un-
able, therefore, to perform job fuanctions that require these physical
abilities.
In order to continue working during her pregnancy, a woman
working at a physically demanding job may require accommoda-
tions including assistance performing some job functions (mechani-
cal assistance or assistance from coworkers), temporary reassign-
ment of job functions, or temporary reassignment to a less physical-
ly demanding job.
A further restriction on a pregnant woman's ability to perform
job functions relates to her appearance. Pregnant women g&n
weight. Their entire body and facial features may become bloated
with retained water. Some pregnant women's ankles swell and they
may develop varicose veins. These changes in appearance make it
difficult or impossible for pregnant women to perform jobs for which
a non-pregnant appearance is a job pre-requisite. Actresses, enter-
tainers, and dancers, for example, may be affected. In order to con-
tinue working during pregnancy, women performing such jobs may
need special uniforms or clothes, a temporary waiver of the appear-
ance requirement, or temporary reassignment to a less public posi-
tion.
Even women in sedentary jobs with no significant physical
demands may have difficulty performing job functions due to the
physical changes associated with pregnancy. Weight gain in the
abdominal area makes working at a desk uncomfortable and con-
tributes to back pain. 4 In one study, nearly one-third of women
working in desk jobs "complained of difficulties of fit as the main
13. Martha Tabor, Pregnancy and Heavy Work, OccuP. HEALTH & SAFETY, Feb.
1983, at 19 (quoting GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, supra note 8).
14. GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WoRK, supra note 8, at 35.
1995]
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limiting factor in the third trimester." 5 Women working in desk
jobs may require special furniture to allow continued employment
without extreme discomfort or injury.
Lax ligaments and easily strained muscles often result in mus-
cle strain or back pain for pregnant women in jobs, such as retail
sales or secretarial work, requiring prolonged standing or sitting in
the same position. 6 Prolonged standing or sitting creates circula-
tory problems for pregnant women. A woman's blood volume in-
creases by thirty to forty percent during pregnancy and the veins in
her uterus and lower body expand. The increased blood volume
forces the heart to work harder. In addition, the woman's growing
uterus interferes with circulation because it presses on major blood
vessels. The combination of increased volume and obstructed flow
creates a tendency for blood to collect in the woman's legs, causing
swollen ankles and varicose veins. This tendency is exacerbated by
jobs requiring prolonged sitting or standing in the same position."
The Council on Scientific Affairs recommends that pregnant women
refrain from prolonged standing (more than four hours at one time)
when they are twenty-four weeks pregnant. Intermittent standing
for more than thirty minutes at a time should be curtailed at thir-
ty-two weeks pregnant. s Women working in jobs requiring pro-
longed standing or sitting may require frequent work breaks per-
mitting them to move about or elevate their feet."
Some of the physical changes associated with pregnancy make
it difficult for pregnant women to comply with rigid work rules that
may be imposed as a condition of employment. Elevated pregnancy-
related hormones cause most women to be nauseous during the
first trimester of pregnancy. For some women, the problem persists
throughout pregnancy. Nausea makes it difficult for pregnant wom-
en to arrive at work on time in the morning and work rules that
prohibit snacking at the work station or restrict breaks can aggra-
vate the problem." Complying with rules restricting work breaks
also causes discomfort for a pregnant woman because "[i]ncreased
blood flow to the kidneys, together with the pressure of the expand-
15. Paul et al., supra note 8, at 156.
16. Id. at 157; see Work and Pregnancy, supra note 8, at 469.
17. JEANNE M. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S HEALTH: MYTHS AND REALI-
TIES 167 (1977); see Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at 197.
18. Effects of Pregnancy on Work Performance, supra note 11, at 1996.
19. GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, supra note 8, at 35.
20. Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at 196-97; see also Work and Pregnancy,
supra note 8, at 469.
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ing uterus on the bladder, and hormonally induced changes all
cause her to urinate frequently."2 Finally, a pregnant woman may
have difficulty complying with work rules limiting absence from the
workplace if she needs to schedule prenatal doctor's visits during
normal work hours." In order to continue working comfortably,
pregnant women require flexible work rules that permit frequent
bathroom and snack breaks and, if possible, flexible starting times
and personal leave for doctor's visits.
In addition to the pregnancy-induced changes that make it
difficult for pregnant women to do their jobs and comply with work
rules, physical changes associated with pregnancy make some work
environments extremely uncomfortable. Increased metabolism along
with increased levels of progesterone and human chorionic gonado-
tropin cause a pregnant woman's temperature to rise approximately
one degree above normal. As a result, work conditions that are too
hot become unbearable." In order to continue working during
pregnancy, a woman working in an extremely hot environment may
require extra ventilation, a fan, or temporary reassignment to a
position in a cooler environment.
Other physical changes associated with pregnancy pose health
hazards for pregnant women in some work environments:
Many maternal physiologic functions operate at peak efficien-
cy during pregnancy. It is a time of maximal production, storage,
and turnover of maternal body constituents. It is a time when the
woman's body ensures that it gets full access to oxygen and nutri-
ents. Ironically, in an environment full of toxins this physiologic
efficiency probably magnifies a woman's exposure ... .
Pregnant women breathe more efficiently than normal. A pregnant
woman requires twenty to thirty percent more oxygen than normal
to accommodate the needs of the fetus and her own growing body.
This need is met primarily by increasing the amount of air exhaled
after each breath. This increase improves lung efficiency because
less air remains "in the lungs to dilute the new air breathed in."'
21. Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at 197.
22. See GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, supra note 8, at 20.
23. Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at 198; see also GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY
AND WORK, supra note 8, at 30.
24. Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at 198.
25. STELLMAN, supra note 17, at 168; see also Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8,
at 198.
1995]
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This increased efficiency may be hazardous to women working in
toxic environments because they may absorb air-borne toxins more
efficiently.26 The increased fatty content of a pregnant woman's
blood and the increased storage of fat throughout her body provides
storage depots for fat soluble toxins such as benzene, toluene, pesti-
cides, and organic solvents. A pregnant woman's increased boney
turnover and improved intestinal absorption of calcium also may
make her more susceptible to toxic substances such as lead and
strontium-90, which are stored in bone, or lead and cadmium which
are absorbed through the same mechanism as calcium.27 In order
to continue working during pregnancy, women working in environ-
ments that expose them to toxic substances may require protective
masks, improved ventilation, or temporary reassignment to a posi-
tion in a less toxic environment.
Table 1 shows the number of women working in occupations
that subject women to health hazards if they are not accommodated
during pregnancy. As you can see, thirty-eight percent of all
working women labor in occupations where they may be unable to
perform their job during pregnancy without risking their health.
26. STELLMAN, supra note 17, at 167-68; Walking a Tightrope, supra note 8, at
198; GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, supra note 8, at 17.
27. Work and Pregnancy, supra note 8, at 468-69; Walking a Tightrope, supra note
8, at 198-200.
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TABLE 1
Potential Work-Related Disabilities
and
Health Risks for Pregnant Women
in Selected Occupations
Occupation Female Potential
Employment Risk Factor or Work-
(est. 1993) Related Disability
Total
(all occupations,
civilian population
16 years and over)
Health Care
(nurses, physical
therapists, LPNs,
aides, orderlies
and attendants)
Retail Sales Workers
and Cashiers
Laborers
(freight, stock,
and material
handlers, helpers)
Farmers, forestry
and logging workers,
fishers and hunters
Mail Carriers
Protective Service
(police, fire fighters
correction institution
officers, sheriffs,
and guards)
54,642,000
3,751,000
4,076,000
845,000
512,000
95,000
370,000
lifting
prolonged standing
air-borne toxins
inflexible work rules
prolonged standing
inflexible work rules
lifing
stretching and reaching
inflexible work rules
heat
lifting
stretching or reaching
pesticides
heat
air-borne toxins
solvents
lifting
prolonged standing/sitting
heat
lifting
climbing ladders
running
19951
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Child Care
(nursery and
kindergarten
teachers, day
care workers)
Athletes
2,059,000
19,000
Actors 37,000
Cleaners
(servants, maids,
house-servors, janitors)
Mechanics and Repairers
Construction Trades
Food Occupations
(bartenders, waiters
waitresses, counter
service, kitchen
workers)
Machine Operators
(textile, apparel,
furnishing, etc.)
Hairdressers
and Cosmetologists
Total
(women employed
in hazardous
occupations)
1,619,000
155,000
95,000
3,324,000
2,870,000
683,000
20,510,000
lifting
running
lifting
balance
running
appearance
climbing stairs and ladders
air-borne toxins
organic solvents
lifting
heat
lifting
climbing
lifting or moving
balance
fat soluble toxins
lifting
appearance
balance
inflexible work rules
pushing and pulling
standing or sitting
inflexible work rules
heat
air-borne toxins
solvents
toluene
(38% of female workforce)
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1993.
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Approximately 6.3% of women of childbearing age (fifteen to
forty-four) give birth to children each year. The birth rate ranges
from 4.3% of women thirty to forty-four years old to 8.6% for wom-
en fifteen to twenty-nine years old.28 In 1992, for example, fifty-
eight million women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four gave
birth to approximately 3.7 million babies." The birth rate for em-
ployed women is somewhat smaller with 4.5% of employed women
fifteen to forty-four years old giving birth each year. For employed
women, the birth rate ranges from 6.1% for women fifteen to twen-
ty-nine years old to 3.4% for women thirty to forty-four years old.3"
Approximately 70% of the women in the labor force are of child-
bearing age (fifteen to forty-four).3 ' If we assume that 70% of the
women working in hazardous occupations are of childbearing age
(14,357,000), and if we can assume that women who give birth
while employed are randomly distributed throughout the workforce,
these figures suggest that 646,000 women each year become preg-
nant while working in hazardous work environments. If younger
women are concentrated in the hazardous professions, that number
soars to nearly one million. Pregnancies in hazardous work environ-
ments may, therefore, constitute as many as 17% to 24% of births
each year.
B. Accommodations Necessary to Protect Fetal Health
In addition to the accommodations a pregnant woman may
require to permit her to continue working in spite of the physical
effects and limitations associated with pregnancy, a pregnant wom-
an also requires accommodations to ensure the health of her devel-
oping fetus. 2 Many chemicals and diseases commonly present in
the workplace create significant risks for fetal health:
Maternal exposure to elevated levels of lead during pregnancy has
28. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT No. 103, CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD A CHILD IN THE LAST YEAR: 1992, at 81 (1994).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT No. 615, CIVILIAN
LABOR FORCE AND PARTICIPATION RATES, WIH PROJECTIONS: 1970 TO 2005, at 395
(1994).
32. The capacity of both men and women to produce healthy offspring can be influ-
enced by workplace hazards. See ROBERT H. BLANK, FETAL PROTECTION IN THE
WORKPLACE 76-78 (1993). This Article is, however, solely concerned with work accommo-
dations required by pregnant women.
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been correlated with mental retardation, intrauterine growth re-
tardation, and neurological disorders in their offspring ....
Inorganic and organic mercury, too, have been found to cross
the placenta in... humans and cause damage to the central ner-
vous system of the fetus ....
Many other substances widely used in industry are known or
suspected to have adverse effects on the reproductive systems of
exposed workers. Chromosomal damage has been reported in
workers exposed to the solvent benezene, an element in paint
strippers, rubber cement, nylon, and detergents. Anesthetic gases
produce miscarriages and birth defects in the progeny of both male
and female operating room and dental personnel. Exposure to
pesticides and chlorinated hydrocarbons used to manufacture
drycleaning fluid and other general solvents causes serious fetal
damage. Workers exposed to vinyl chloride... has been tied to
abnormal rates of miscarriage and chromosomal damage of fetus-
es....
In addition to the growing evidence about specific chemical
hazards a number of studies have examined the effects of particu-
lar workplace settings on reproduction, several of which are criti-
cal to working women. One study found that women involved in
metal, chemical, wood, textile, and farm industries and medical
technicians are at increased risk of fetal death. [Another study]
found the highest rates of stillbirth and neonatal deaths correlated
with women working in glass and pottery, hospitals, laundry/dry
cleaning, the chemical industry, and woodworking and furniture
manufacturing... Another study found an increase in chromo-
somal abnormalities in women who worked in laboratories and the
printing industry ....
In a major Finnish study the highest rate of spontaneous
abortion was found among women textile workers.... A major
study of California women found that work in electronics assembly
was significantly associated with the delivery of low birth-weight
infants.. .. '
33. Id. at 68-71; see A.D. McDonald et al., Fetal Death and Work in Pregnancy, 45
BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 148 (1988) (stillbirth and abortion rate significantly elevated in
women exposed to solvents in manufacturing jobs); M.J. Saurel-Cubizolles et al., Work in
Operating Rooms and Pregnancy Outcome Among Nurses, 66 INTL ARCH. OCCUP. &
ENVTL. HEALTH 235, 235-41 (1994) (rate of spontaneous abortion significantly higher for
pregnancies during which mothers worked in an operating room than for other pregnan-
cies); H. Taskinen et al., Laboratory Work and Pregnancy Outcome, 26 J. OccuP. MED.
311 (1994) (study of women working in laboratories found significant associations be-
tween exposure to toluene and spontaneous abortion); see also GUIDELINES ON PREGNAN-
CY AND WORK, supra note 8, at 23-28.
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The following Table indicates potential health hazards for the
offspring of pregnant women working in female dominated profes-
sions:
TABLE 2
Potential Health Hazards to Fetus in Selected Occupations
Occupation Female Employment Potential Risk
(est. 1988) Factors
Health Care
(nurses, aides,
dental assistants,
laboratory technicians)
Clothing and textile/
laundry and drycleaning
Office workers
Hairdressers and
cosmetologists
Cleaning, janitorial,
household jobs
Childcare
3,500,000
1,350,000
14,500,000
750,000
1,750,000
1,185,000
Ionizing radiation
Infection
Mercury vapor
Anesthetic gases
Disinfectants and
sterilizing agents
Phenolic compounds
Benzidene-type dyes
Formaldehyde
Solvents
Carbon disulfide
Benzene in rubber
cement, cleaning
compounds, and
solvents
Ozone or methanol &
ammonia from
duplicating machines
Air contaminants
Bleaches
Hair Dyes
Nail varnishes
(acetone,
toluene, xylene,
plasticizers)
Cleaning substances
Disinfectants
Bleach/ammonia
Organic solvents
Infections
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,Employment and Earnings, January, 1989.'
34. BLANK, supra note 32, at 71 (Table 3.6).
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In order to continue working during pregnancy without harm-
ing their offspring, women working in environments that expose
them to toxic substances or diseases may require protective masks,
improved ventilation, or temporary reassignment to a position in a
less toxic environment.
In addition to chemical and biological hazards found in the
workplace are hazards associated with strenuous physical work,
noise, and unusual work schedules. Intense physical activity de-
creases the flow of blood to the uterus.35 A number of studies have
found a relationship between heavy physical labor during pregnan-
cy and preterm delivery and/or low fetal weight in relation to gesta-
tional age.36 Some studies, however, suggest that adequate caloric
intake can negate the adverse affects of heavy physical labor.37
Others have suggested that the incidence of preterm birth and
small size associated with physical labor may result from other fac-
tors, such as exposure to toxic chemicals, that correlate with jobs
requiring heavy physical labor.3" Women working irregular hours,
evening hours and rotating shifts have infants with lower birth
weights than women working day shifts, especially if the woman al-
ready has two or more children.39 Work schedule also has been
correlated with pregnancy loss.4° Noise and vibration have been
correlated with stillbirth, low birth weight and preterm labor.4'
35. Geoffrey Chamberlain, Work in Pregnancy, 302 BRIT. MED. J. 1072 (1991).
36. Lenore J. Launer et al., The Effect of Maternal Work on Fetal Growth and
Duration of Pregnancy: A Prospective Study, 97 BRiT. J. OBST. & GYN. 62, 62-70 (1990);
A.D. McDonald et al., Prematurity and Work in Pregnancy, 45 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 56,
56-62 (1988) (heavy lifting related to low birth weight and preterm birth); cf McDonald
et al., supra note 33, at 148 (increased rates of abortion and stillbirth "found in women
exposed to high levels of physical stress, particularly weight lifting, other physical effort
and standing").
37. Talat J. Hassan et al., Excessive Physical Work During Pregnancy and Birth
Weight, 16 ASIA-OcANiA J. OBST. & GYN. 17, 18-19 (1990).
38. See generally Tuula Nurimen et al., Physical Work Load, Fetal Development and
Course of Pregnancy, 15 SCAND. J. WORK & ENvTL. HEALTH 404 (1989); see McDonald et
al., supra note 36, at 5 ("role of unidentified factors related to selection for work are
difficult to assess").
39. See generally Gosta Axelsson et al., Outcome of Pregnancy in Relation to Irreg-
ular and Inconvenient Work Schedules, 46 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 393 (1989); McDonald et
al., supra note 36 (long hours of work and changing shift work related to low birth
weight and preterm labor).
40. Clair Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work Schedule During Preg.
nancy, 4 EPIDEMIOLOGY 73 (1993) (risk of pregnancy loss four times higher among
women with fixed evening work schedules in comparison with women on fixed day
schedules and more than twice as high among women on a fixed night schedule).
41. McDonald et al., supra note 33, at 152 (vibration related to still.birth); see also
[Vol. XXV
Pregnancy in the Workplace
In order to continue working during her pregnancy without
harming her offspring, a woman working at a physically demanding
job (see Table 1 for occupations and number of women affected)
may require accommodations including assistance performing some
job functions (mechanical assistance or assistance from co-workers),
temporary reassignment of job functions, or temporary reassign-
ment to a less physically demanding job. A woman working on a
swing shift, evening shift, or night shift (e.g. health care workers,
police officers, firefighters, food-service workers, and machine oper-
ators) may require temporary assignment to the day shift in order
to protect her developing fetus from harm. Table 1 indicates the
number of women working in these occupations. Finally, women
working as mechanics and repairers, in the construction trades or
operating manufacturing machines, jobs that expose them to signifi-
cant noise and/or vibration, may require temporary reassignment to
a position in an environment less stressful to their developing off-
spring.
C. Policy Considerations - Should Workplace Accommodations
Be Required?
Before considering the legal arguments available to women to
force their employers to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace,
it is essential to consider the policy implications of mandating
workplace accommodations for pregnant women. It is easy to con-
clude that pregnant women and their developing offspring would be
healthier if they were not exposed to workplace hazards such as
lifting, climbing, reaching, running, prolonged sitting or standing,
toxic substances, diseases, noise, vibration, and inconvenient or
rigid work schedules. In addition, working pregnant women clearly
would be more comfortable if employers allowed them flexibility in
snack and bathroom breaks and protected them from excessively
hot work environments. All of these problems, however, could be
avoided if pregnant women simply stopped working.
Why should the law impose an obligation on employers to make
it possible for pregnant women to work in a healthy and comfort-
able environment? Accommodating pregnancy in the workplace is
costly. What economic benefits justify imposing these costs on em-
ployers? Are there also non-economic costs and benefits associated
McDonald et al., supra note 36, at 60 (noise related to low birth weight in the health
and manufacturing sectors).
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with requiring employers to accommodate pregnancy?
1. Economic Costs and Benefits of Accommodation
Many pregnant women and their children might benefit if the
pregnant woman could avoid hazardous work and stay at home
both during her pregnancy and during the child's first few years to
provide the child the physical advantages of nursing as well as the
developmental advantages of a close nurturing relationship with a
parent." This ideal, however, often is neither feasible nor advan-
42. A number of studies have questioned the impact on children of any kind of day
care during the first year of life. Others have raised questions, not about day care per
se, but about the quality of care provided in many day care centers. See Andrew
Cherlin, Too Young for Day Care, N.Y. TEIES, Sept. 17, 1992, at A25 (citing a nation-
wide study conducted by the Labor Department and the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development finding negative effects on the intellectual development
of children whose mothers work outside the home while the child is less than one year
old); Bill Hendrick, Some Child Care Centers May Be Harmful to Kids, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 12, 1995, at Cli (discussing the dangers of poorly run day care centers for
children's physical and mental development); Life's First Bond, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Laud-
erdale), Dec. 18, 1994, at 1E (discussing the importance of bonding with a parent during
the first year of life for a baby's health and emotional development); "Quiet Crisis" for
U.S. Children?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23, 1994, at A20 (citing a recent study by the
Families and Work Institute finding that only nine percent of family child care arrange-
ments provide good quality care); see also BRENDA HUNTER, HOME BY CHOICE 52-72
(1991) (discussing the psychological harm to children of a mother's early absence from
home).
There is not, however, unanimous agreement that a working mother has a nega-
tive impact on the development of her child. Erik Eckhohn, in Learning if Infants Are
Hurt When Mothers Go to Work, reports that experts generally agree that even during
the first year of life any harm from good nonmaternal care is small and for children
from poor families early, high-quality care improves test scores. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6,
1992, at Al. Sandra Scarr, Deborah Phillips, and Kathleen McCartney reviewed a report
on research of working mothers conducted in 1982 by the National Academy of Sciences:
"A distinguished panel of social scientists reviewed all of the evidence and concluded
that there were no consistent effects of maternal employment on child development."
Sandra Scarr et al., Working Mothers and Their Families, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1402,
1404 (1989). Another review of the research conducted by Lois Hoffman in 1984 con-
cluded that although some studies
found that young sons were slightly disadvantaged by the loss of maternal
attention in the early years.... [Dlaughters of employed mothers were often
reported to be more self-confident, to achieve better grades in school, and to
more frequently pursue careers themselves than were daughters of nonemployed
mothers.... Hoffman also noted that few investigators asked how maternal
employment could benefit children by higher family income, higher self-esteem
for mothers, a less sharp distinction between male and female roles, and a
more positive role model for both sons and daughters for later in their own
lives.
Lois W. Hoffman, Effects of Maternal Employment in the Two-Parent Family, 44 AM.
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tageous for the woman or her children. First, nearly 30% of preg-
nant women are either unmarried or separated.' Nearly 70% of preg-
nant teens are unmarried." Single parenthood, however, is not
primarily a teenage problem. Only 3% of single mothers are under
twenty; 84% are twenty-five or older.45 Nor is single parenthood a
matter of choice for many women. Divorces are on the rise.' In
1992, 25% of all families with children were headed by single wom-
en.47 Forty percent of children do not live with their fathers. Sixty
percent will spend the majority of their childhood living in a single
parent family headed by a woman."
For many children, living in a single parent household headed
by a woman is the best alternative available. Many children are
unfortunate enough to have a father who uses drugs, abuses alco-
hol, engages in criminal activity, or abuses the child or the child's
mother.49 For these children, a single parent may be the best al-
ternative."
Unfortunately, the economic future of single women with chil-
dren is bleak - nearly one-half will be poor.5' Very few single par-
PSYCHOLOGIST 283 (1989). The authors concluded that "the school achievement, IQ test
scores, and emotional and social development of working mothers' children are every bit
as good as that of children whose mothers do not work." Id.
43. William J. Bennett, Rescuing America's Children, An Agenda for Saving a
Generation at Risk, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Apr. 9, 1995, at G1; see CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 28, at 79 (twenty-eight percent of women who had a child in 1992 were ei-
ther separated, widowed, divorced, or never married).
44. Nancy Weaver, Teen Moms Face Harsh Future, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 23,
1995, at Al; THE 1994 INFORMATION PLEASE WOIMEN'S SOURCEBOOK 288 (Lisa DiMona &
Constance Herndon eds., 1994) (in 1988, 66% of women under age 20 who gave birth
were single).
45. THE 1994 INFORMATION PLEASE WOMEN'S SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at 290.
46. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1993 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS:
TRENDS & ISSUES 10 (1994).
47. Robert Suro, For Women, Varied Reasons for Single Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1992, at A12.
48. Bennett, supra note 43, at G1.
49. Infante-Rivard et al., supra note 40, at 86-87; see Karen Fernau, Children Imi-
tate Violence at Home, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 5, 1995, at B1 ("in nearly 25 percent of
battered families, the man physically abuses the children as well"); Leslie Gross, Domes-
tic Violence, THE CAPITAL, July 19, 1994, at El (reporting that "[e]ach year, an estimat-
ed 3.3 million children in the United States witness domestic violence, according to
statistics from the Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence").
50. See Ellen Warren & Patricia Callahan, 2 Parents Aren't Always Better than
One, CHICAGOLAND FINAL EDITION, Apr. 2, 1995, at C1.
51. Carrie Teegardin, Single with Children, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 7, 1995, at
G6; see RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURvE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 137 (1994) ("[flor families headed by a single
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ents receive child support payments.52 Welfare provides a safety
net for pregnant women and women with small children, but gov-
ernment support provides only subsistence living. "[T]he combina-
tion of AFDC and Food Stamps is below the poverty line in every
state and under 75 percent of the poverty line in thirty-eight states
and the District of Columbia."53 The actual level of support provid-
ed by the welfare system is even worse than it sounds because the
federal government has set the poverty line substantially below
what any reasonable person would define as poverty. For example,
in 1992, a woman with one child is considered "poor" by federal
standards only if she earned less than $9,137 per year or $761 per
month.' And even the minimal safety net provided by AFDC is in
jeopardy for some pregnant women. The House of Representatives
recently passed a welfare bill that would bar unmarried parents
under the age of eighteen from receiving welfare benefits."5 Chil-
dren living in poverty are at risk, particularly in urban centers
where rural solutions such as growing food are unavailable, and the
problems of poverty are multiplied by the concentration of low-in-
come individuals in one geographic location. "These are environ-
ments in which prenatal care is inadequate, intervals between
woman, the poverty rate in 1991 was 36 percent; for all other American families, 6 per-
cent. Indeed the national poverty rate for households headed by a single woman has
been above 30 percent since official poverty figures began to be available in 1959"). The
Children's Defense Fund, in a study based on 1992 Census Bureau Data, reports that
54.3% of children under 18 in female-headed families were poor. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND, WASTING AMERICA'S FUTURE at xviii (1994). The United States Department of
Commerce reports that in 1990, 58% of children in mother-only families were low income
and between 1980 and 1990, 46.8% of children living with a single mother were poor.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE THE AMERICAN CHILDREN 13-14 (1993).
The poverty rate for single mothers is significantly higher than for the population as a
whole. In 1991, 20% of children in America lived below the poverty line. ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 25 (1994).
52. WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 46, at 11; KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note
51, at 26.
53. KIDs COUNT DATA BoOK, supra note 51, at 27. For example, a mother with one
child in Connecticut receives a flat grant of $581 each month, while a mother with three
children receives $683. A pregnant woman with no dependent children receives a total of
$356 each month. Connecticut benefits are high compared to some other states and a
current proposal in Connecticut would reduce these benefits, which were set in 1990, to
the lower 1988 level. "Nationwide, monthly benefits for a family of three average
$378.02. Alaska pays the highest monthly benefits, $923, and Mississippi the lowest,
$120." Bruce Alpert, Plans for Re-Working Welfare Focus on Education, THE PLAIN
DEALER, May 4, 1994, at 14A.
54. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 51, at 3.
55. Sabrina Eaton, House Oks Welfare Bill after Week of Rancor, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 25, 1995, at 1A.
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births often too small, beliefs about child care too often dysfunction-
al, access to and use of well baby care inadequate, early interven-
tion for child disabilities inadequate, and thus in which child mor-
tality and morbidity are rampant.""
Women who do not receive adequate prenatal care are more
likely to give birth to low birth-weight babies who "have a high
probability of experiencing developmental problems."57 Poverty
threatens the quality of a child's nutrition, shelter, educational
resources, neighborhood environment, and medical care.5" Children
living in poor neighborhoods are more likely to be exposed to crime,
toxic chemicals, pollution, drugs, and an absence of recreational
opportunities. 9 The environment associated with poverty has a
negative impact on children. 0 Long-term poverty is significantly
associated with lower IQ's, lower scores on tests of mental ability
and skills, lower incidence of completing high school and a higher
incidence of child abuse.61 The affects of poverty outweigh the im-
pact of single parenthood.62 In addition, children who live in pover-
ty have a significantly higher incidence of serious health problems,
including physical, sensory and mental disabilities serious enough
to limit daily activities and or require special education.63 Finally,
persistent poverty has a negative effect on a child's mental health:
"The length of time spent in poverty is an important predictor of
children's mental health, even after current poverty status is taken
56. James Garbarino, The Meaning of Poverty in the World of Children, in ROBIN
BROWN, THE REFERENCE SHELF: CHILDREN IN CRISIS 135 (1994).
57. KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 51, at 21-22.
58. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 51, at 13-29, 38-45.
59. Id. at 39-42, 46-48; see KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 51, at 21 (families
living in severely distressed neighborhoods "find it exceptionally difficult to ensure that
their children will grow into healthy, skilled, and productive adults.... [C]hildren of
these neighborhoods are far more likely . . . to be exposed to violence, do less well in
school, become unmarried teen parents, and fail to make a smooth transition to work").
60. Greg J. Duncan et al., Economic Deprivation and Early Childhood Development,
65 CHILD DEV. 296, 313 (1994) ("neighborhood income differences were significant deter-
minants of age-5 IQ.... Residing in neighborhoods with more affluent neighbors
raised IQ 1.6 points for each 10% increase in the proportion of affluent neighbors").
61. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 51, at 29-36, 82-83; see STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK ON THE AMERICAN FAMILY 249 (Bruce Chadwick & Tim Heaton eds., 1992)
(incidence of child abuse significantly higher in families with an income less than
$15,000 per year).
62. G. Duncan et al., supra note 60, at 311-12 ("family income is a far more pow-
erful correlate of age-5 IQ than more conventional ... measures such as maternal
education, ethnicity, and female headship .... [T]he effects of persistent poverty were
60%-80% higher than the effects of transient poverty").
63. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 51, at 64-80.
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into account. As the length of time spent in poverty increases, so
too do children's feelings of unhappiness, anxiety, and depen-
dence."64
The cost associated with poverty among single mothers is not
limited to the women and their children. Poor children impose a
substantial burden on society as a whole including the costs of
welfare, special education, repeating grades at school, and medical
care for poverty-related medical problems and drug treatment.
Is workplace accommodation a good strategy for dealing with
the epidemic of poverty in single-parent households headed by
women? Certainly there are other options. Perhaps the incidence of
illegitimate births can be reduced by improving education to en-
courage consistent use of birth control measures. And for women
who nonetheless get pregnant, workplace accommodations may not
be the best approach to supporting them and their offspring. Stay-
ing at home during pregnancy and for an extended period of time
after childbirth often would meet the health and developmental
needs of mothers and their babies better than providing accommo-
dations in the workplace.65 Unwed mothers and their children
could be provided for by increasing welfare benefits or by making
fathers financially responsible for their offspring. Women could be
encouraged to return to the workplace following pregnancy by pro-
viding job training programs and child care. Such measures should
be undertaken, but it is likely that, even if successful, they would
only reduce, not eliminate, the problem of poverty in single parent
households.
The Family and Medical Leave Act66 is another form of re-
sponse with significant advantages. The FMLA provides many
working women with the right to take unpaid leave during preg-
nancy or to care for a child. The FMLA encourages working by
mandating that employers provide unpaid leave and hold positions
open for employees who take leave. The FMLA, however, does not
solve the problem of providing financial support to single pregnant
women during that leave.
In a recent article, Samuel Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum
propose the creation of a pregnancy support system similar to the
64. Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Poverty, Parenting, and Children's
Mental Health, 58 Am. Soc. REV. 351, 360 (1993).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. V 1993). See infra part IV for a more complete
discussion of the benefits available under the FMLA.
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unemployment compensation system to provide women with paid
leave without discouraging employers from hiring women.67 This
approach has many advantages. It encourages work because the
proposed benefit is available only to working women and, like the
FMLA, the proposal calls for requiring employers to hold jobs open
for women on leave. It provides for pregnant women and their off-
spring during leave, takes the woman and her child away from the
potential hazards of the workplace, and supports women while they
nurse and care for their babies during those crucial early months.
The primary shortcoming of this proposal is its cost. Although the
cost would be shared by all employers and the cost may well be
worth the short-term benefits to women and children and the long
range benefits to society, the cost of the proposal nearly guarantees
that it will never become law in this country. And until this propos-
al, or something like it, becomes law, pregnant women will be faced
with the problem of providing for themselves and their children.
For single parent families, working during pregnancy and early
childhood may provide the best standard of living available for the
mother and child. Women who work during their pregnancy remain
productive members of society who do not impose a burden on pub-
lic money. The Department of Commerce reports that when a single
mother works full time, the chance of her family living in poverty
reduces markedly. Remember that among single parent families
headed by women, nearly half live in poverty. In comparison, only
twenty-four percent of families headed by women working full time
qualify as low income.68 Protecting the health of pregnant workers
and their offspring by requiring workplace accommodations should
reduce the incidence of costly medical complications for the mother
and child. Encouraging women to continue working in many in-
stances will transfer the medical costs associated with pregnancy
and childbirth from the taxpayer to private insurers. Encouraging
women to work during pregnancy minimizes the career interruption
necessitated by childbirth, increasing the likelihood that these
women will successfully return to work, rather than to the public
dole, following childbirth. Mandating workplace accommodations to
permit pregnant women to work during pregnancy transfers some
of the costs associated with pregnancy from the pregnant woman
67. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accom-
modating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994).
68. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 51, at 16.
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and her child to society at large in the form of increased costs for
products as a result of increased expenses by employers. This is
appropriate. Children are society's future and obligation.69 Meeting
this obligation through increased employer expenses is less costly
than through public handouts.
2. Non-Economic Benefits and Costs of Accommodation
Feminists have long struggled with the problem of developing a
legal theory capable of promoting employment opportunities for
women, without either ignoring women's inherent biological differ-
ences or demanding special treatment or accommodation for those
differences. The early vision of equality for women, based on equal
treatment, has been criticized for failing to acknowledge that
women's differences place them at a disadvantage when the law
requires only that women be treated the same as men."° The strict
equality approach fails to question the assumptions underlying
gender-neutral social institutions that severely disadvantage wom-
en and fails to protect women when they are victimized by those
institutions.7' On the other hand, achieving employment opportu-
nities for women by requiring special treatment or accommodation
for women's differences has its own dangers. Highlighting differenc-
es stereotypes gender roles and provides a justification for imposing
harmful limitations on women.72 The history of gender discrimina-
tion in the United States is littered with cases of "protective" legis-
lation and policies that, in reality, served primarily to limit the
rights and opportunities of women. 3
69. See infra part H.C.2.
70. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L.
REv. 1279, 1306 (1987) (" [legal equality analysis 'runs out' when it encounters 'real'
difference, and only becomes available if an when the difference is analogized to some
experience men can have too").
71. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797, 837 (1990)
("[the core truth is that an insistence on gender neutrality by definition precludes pro-
tection for women victimized by gender").
72. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 190 (1982) ("by insisting upon our
differences ... [we] promote and reinforce the us-them dichotomy that permits the
Rehaquists and Stewarts to resolve matters of great importance and complexity by the
simplistic, reflexive assertion that men and women 'are simply not similarly situated'");
see also Williams, supra note 71, at 839 (the inequality approach "reinforce[s] and
legitimize[s] the traditional assumption that childrearing is 'naturally' the province of
women").
73. For example, in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), the Supreme
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Is it, therefore, a mistake to suggest that pregnancy should be
accommodated in the workplace? Certainly, seeking special privi-
leges for pregnant women may promote discrimination against
women in the workplace because focusing on the inability of women
to perform a variety of jobs while pregnant confirms employers' be-
liefs that women cannot compete equally in the workplace. Further,
highlighting women's differences provides justification for different
treatment and disadvantages in other contexts. Finally, from a
practical perspective, imposing an obligation to accommodate preg-
nancy may deter employers from hiring women to avoid the costs
associated with accommodating their pregnancies.
In spite of these dangers, employers should be obligated to
accommodate pregnancy. First, the physical differences between
women and men associated with pregnancy are in no way analo-
gous to any stereotypical view of women's appropriate social role in
this society. Women are in fact different when they are pregnant.
Pregnancy is a difference that can be acknowledged without sug-
gesting that women are otherwise less competent than men to per-
form most jobs. Pregnancy is not analogous to job-related character-
istics such as strength, mathematical ability, manual dexterity, or
aggression. With respect to such job-related skills and abilities,
men and women may differ as a group, while individual men and
women may not fit the group stereotype. Pregnancy, however, is
exclusively a female phenomenon. Acknowledging this fact says
nothing about whether women are otherwise competent.
Second, insofar as employers might avoid hiring women to
avoid the costs of accommodating their pregnancy, such avoidance
violates equal employment laws. A better policy would spread the
costs of accommodating pregnancy to eliminate this disincentive. 4
Unless and until such legislation is enacted, however, protection
Court upheld Illinois' refusal to grant a license to a woman to practice law: "The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life." Id. at 141; see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (upholding Florida's jury selection system which excluded women who did not
affirmatively indicate a desire to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (uphold-
ing a Michigan statute prohibiting employing women as bartenders unless the woman
was the wife or daughter of a male owner); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(upholding an Oregon statute prohibiting the employment of women in factories for more
than 10 hours per day).
74. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 67, at 2154 (proposing a system sim-
ilar to unemployment compensation to spread the costs of accommodating pregnant
women in the workplace).
1995]
Stetson Law Review
against discrimination is available.
Most importantly, accommodating pregnancy in the workplace
should not be classified as an issue of gender discrimination at all.
The object of accommodating pregnancy should not be to provide
equal employment opportunities to women. Pregnancy should be
accommodated because the health of a developing fetus is at stake.
Pregnancy should be accommodated to promote uninterrupted em-
ployment for women because the health and welfare of that
woman's developing fetus and any other children that she may have
is at stake. Accommodating pregnancy in the workplace is a child
welfare issue, not an equal employment issue. The dangers that
workplace hazards pose to the developing fetus cannot be ignored.
Employers should be obligated to provide a safe workplace either by
improving safety for all employees,75 by providing accommodations
to women who request them, or both.
Equal employment opportunity for women, however, is not
irrelevant to the goal of promoting child welfare. First, most single
parent households are headed by women and, as discussed in the
previous section, these families are at serious risk for poverty. En-
couraging the employment of single female heads of household by
obligating employers to accommodate pregnancy is a small step in
the direction of reducing the risk of poverty for these families and
their children. Second, the employment rights of women are impli-
cated by any policy adopted with a goal of protecting a developing
fetus from harm. Only recently, employers sought to promote fetal
health by excluding fertile women from jobs in hazardous work
environments. In International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,7 6
the Supreme Court ruled that excluding women from dangerous
jobs discriminates against them in violation of Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 If the rights of the developing
fetus are to be protected, they must be protected without interfering
with the employment rights of women. Accommodating pregnancy
75. See Christine Neylon O'Brien & Margo E.D. Reder, Strategies for Implementing
Workplace Reproductive and Health Programs, 19 J. LEGIS. 97 (1993) (urging employers
to develop reproductive health programs to safeguard "employers' economic well-being,
the safety and health of all workers, and their offspring); Mark A. Rothstein, Substantive
and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards As an Example,
12 ENVTL. AFFAIRs 627, 699 (1985) (suggesting that new regulatory strategies should "be
developed to bring about reasonable, effective regulation of reproductive hazards under
OSHA").
76. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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in the workplace serves the interests of both the worker and her
child.
Although the policy justifications supporting accommodating
pregnancy in the workplace are derived primarily from a
cost/benefit analysis and from society's obligation to promote the
health of its offspring, the legal analysis and strategies that follow
focus on equal employment arguments supporting an employer's
obligation to accommodate pregnancy. This focus is necessitated by
the current state of the law which deals with pregnancy in the
workplace as an equal employment issue.
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS UNDER THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT HAS PROVIDED
SOME PREGNANT WOMEN WITH A RIGHT TO
WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196478 by adding a new subsection, 701(k),
which provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... ."
In International Union v. Johnson Controls," the Supreme
Court interpreted this provision to require employers to provide
pregnant women with the same work opportunities that it provides
to other individuals with a similar capacity to work. In that case,
the employer excluded fertile women from battery manufacturing
jobs involving exposure to lead in order to protect their offspring
from damage. The Court found that danger to a fetus or potential
fetus does not interfere with a woman's ability to efficiently manu-
facture batteries. The women could not, therefore, be prohibited
from performing the job while other similarly qualified workers
were permitted to work.8'
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
80. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
81. Id. at 191-92, 206.
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Johnson Controls did not address the question of whether preg-
nant women are entitled to request alternative work assignments
or other accommodations in order to protect their own health or the
health of their offspring during pregnancy. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's "Questions and Answers on the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act" indicates that employers must process a
pregnant employee's requests for benefits based on her physical
condition the same way as any other employee's request." Lower
courts, applying the PDA, have followed the Johnson Controls
Court and the EEOC guidelines, and have required employers to
accommodate the needs of pregnant employees only when failing to
accommodate treats pregnant women differently from other employ-
ees "similar in their ability or inability to work."83 For example, in
Adams v. Nolan," the Eighth Circuit held that a police depart-
ment should have assigned a pregnant employee to light duty be-
cause other similarly situated officers who were temporarily dis-
abled due to non-work related injuries were granted light duty.
Similarly, in EEOC v. Ackerman, Hoods & McQueen,85 a pregnant
worker was entitled to be excused from overtime work because the
employer had an unwritten policy of granting work schedule re-
quests for personal and medical reasons for other employees. In
Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc.,86 the court found that the
employer violated Title VII by limiting maternity leave to three
months while permitting other disabled employees to apply for
extended leave.
In keeping with the equal treatment approach of Johnson Con-
trols, women denied accommodations to protect their own health or
the health of their unborn children have not succeeded in establish-
ing a violation of Title VII when their employer has denied accom-
modations to similarly situated employees. For example, in EEOC
v. Detroit-Macomb Hospital Center,87 a pregnant employee asked
to be excused from treating patients in isolation to protect the
health of her fetus. The employer placed the pregnant employee on
82. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 app. Questions 5, 6 (1994).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
84. 962 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1992).
85. 956 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 60 (1992).
86. 780 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Comm. Consol.
Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 1988) (pregnant worker entitled to combine
sick leave with unpaid maternity or general leave if other employees permitted to
combine paid and unpaid leave).
87. Nos. 91-1088 & 91-1278, 1992 WL 6099 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1992).
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involuntary leave pursuant to a general policy of placing individu-
als with temporary medical restrictions on involuntary leave. Be-
cause similarly situated employees were not accommodated, the
employer's failure to accommodate the woman's pregnancy did not
violate Title VII.' In Sanderson v. St. Louis University,9 a preg-
nant security guard was not entitled to transfer to light duty be-
cause the employer did not provide light duty assignments to em-
ployees regardless of the source of their disability.0
In short, the PDA's prohibition against disparate treatment
requires employers to accommodate pregnant employees, but only if
the employer already accommodates other similarly situated em-
ployees. Disparate treatment claims under the PDA provide only
limited relief for pregnant employees working in jobs that endanger
their health or the health of their offspring.
IV THE PDA ANVD THE ADA TOGETHER SUPPORT A
WOMAN'S RIGHT TO ACCOMMODATIONS FOR PREGNANCY-
RELATED DISABILITIES
A. Reasonable Accommodations Are Required by the PDA
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to
provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical...
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an... employee, unless such covered entity can demon-
strate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity ... ",
If a pregnant woman is an "individual with a disability," then
she is entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA. Such
ADA accommodations include 'job restructuring, part-time or modi-
fied work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant posi-
88. Id.; see also Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala.
1993) (pregnant nurse not entitled to be excused from treating HIV patient to protect
unborn child because all nurses were required to treat all patients).
89. 586 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
90. Id.; see also Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (failure to provide
light duty to pregnant mail handler did not violate Title VII because light duty policy
applied equally to all similarly situated disabled employees); Elie v. K-Mart Corp., 64
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 957 (E.D. La. 1994); Robinson v. Vidmar, No. 92-4074,
1993 WL 323849 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994); Ekumah v.
Greenery Group, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1045 (D. Mass. 1992).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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tion .... "92 These are exactly the accommodations women require
in order to continue working during pregnancy. In order to be
"qualified," and therefore entitled to ADA protection, an individual
must be able to perform the essential functions of the job in ques-
tion. This requirement limits the reasonable accommodation obliga-
tions of employers in that the employer is not required to restruc-
ture jobs or modify work schedules in ways that alter the essential
functions of the job. Nonetheless, the reasonable accommodation
requirement seems well suited to meet the needs of pregnant em-
ployees. If an employee, for example, cannot lift heavy weights, the
reasonable accommodation requirement might require the employer
to reassign the heavy lifting aspects of the job to other employees or
perhaps to provide the pregnant employee with equipment to assist
her in performing the heavy lifting. A reasonable accommodation
requirement might also obligate an employer to allow a pregnant
woman suffering from morning nausea to work a flexible morning
schedule.
Under the ADA, an "individual with a disability" is a person
who has or is perceived as having an "impairment that substantial-
ly limits one or more of the major life activities" of the individu-
al. 3 The EEOC, in its interpretive guidance, concludes that preg-
nancy is not an impairment and, therefore, that pregnant women
are not entitled to the protection provided by the ADA. 4
The EEOC's regulations, however, are not necessarily the last
word on the meaning of the statute. Although the ADA requires the
Commission to "issue regulations" to carry out the ADA, courts
generally will not defer to regulations if they provide "unreason-
able" interpretations of statutory language or if they are inconsis-
tent with clear legislative intent. This is especially true where, as
here, Congress has not explicitly left gaps in the statute for the
agency to fill.95 One commentator, Collette G. Matzzie, has argued
that the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA's coverage is inconsis-
tent with legislative intent.96 Matzzie argues that the ADA's broad
92. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
93. Id. § 12102(2)(A). The regulations to implement the ADA define physical im-
pairment as: "Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the [several] body systems.... " 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(b) (1994).
94. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(h), ().
95. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION 743-44 (1994).
96. See Collette G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommo-
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language, the absence of an explicit statutory exclusion, and
Congress' broad remedial purpose in enacting the ADA all support
including pregnancy within its coverage. 7
It is not necessary, however, to bring pregnancy within the
ADA for the ADA to have an impact on the rights of pregnant
workers to accommodation in the workplace. First, the ADA, by
imposing affirmative obligations on employers to accommodate
employees' disabilities, alters the mindset of both employers and
employees. As we have already discussed, feminists have long de-
bated the advantages and disadvantages of women seeking prefer-
ences or accommodations in the workplace." Now, Congress has
embraced the concept of achieving equal employment opportunity
by accommodating differences. Employers are obligated to treat
disabled individuals differently and preferentially in order to level
the playing field. Thus, an individual with a disability such as mul-
tiple sclerosis, that makes it difficult for the employee to walk,
might be entitled under the ADA to an accommodation such as an
office on the first floor. However, another worker whose walking is
impaired by a temporary injury, such as a broken leg, has no right
to an accommodation.
As accommodation becomes commonplace in the workplace, the
expectations of pregnant employees will be raised. Whether the
ADA covers pregnant employees or not, they will see their situation
as comparable to that of individuals who are disabled by accidents
or disease. As we have seen, pregnancy is a disabling condition.
Pregnant women have difficulty climbing stairs and ladders, as do
individuals with multiple sclerosis. Pregnant women have nausea,
as do cancer patients receiving chemotherapy treatment. Pregnant
women, like employees with disabling back conditions, cannot lift
heavy weights. Pregnant women themselves often have disabling
back pains. Like individuals with arthritis, pregnant women are
uncomfortable standing or sitting in the same position for extended
periods of time. Pregnant women require frequent bathroom breaks,
as do individuals with some forms of diabetes. Pregnant women are
sensitive to air-borne toxins as are individuals suffering from asth-
dating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993).
97. Id.; see also Brennan v. National Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F. Supp. 331
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing pregnancy discrimination as a cause of action under the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
disability).
98. See supra part II.
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ma, emphysema, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. When
pregnant women see employers accommodate the needs of individu-
als protected by the ADA, they will demand and expect those same
accommodations.
The civil rights movement in the United States was motivated
primarily by a desire to eradicate discrimination against African-
Americans. Other classifications of individuals, however, quickly
perceived that if it is unfair to judge an individual solely on the
basis of her race, it is also unfair to judge an individual solely on
the basis of her gender, national origin, or religion. When Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it extended protection against
discrimination not only to African-Americans, but also to other
groups including women. Since 1964, more groups have seen them-
selves as subjects of arbitrary discrimination and demanded legal
protection from discrimination. The ADA is likely to set off a new
wave of demands for legal protection. The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act has identified a right to a new variety of equal opportunity.
Other groups, including pregnant women, are likely to see them-
selves as equally entitled to that right.
The question is whether, absent coverage by the ADA and
without any additional legislation, there is any legal basis for preg-
nant women to demand the same accommodations that disabled
individuals are entitled to under the ADA. Individuals covered by
the ADA may, like pregnant women, require leave from work to see
a doctor. Like pregnant women, disabled individuals may be unable
to conform to rigid work rules or may be unable to perform job
functions such as climbing stairs and lifting heavy weights. If an
employer, in compliance with the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement, grants leave, provides flexible work rules, or assigns a
disabled individual to light duty, the PDA seems to require that
employer to provide the same accommodations to pregnant employ-
ees who need the same accommodations.99 More broadly, if an em-
ployer adopts a general policy of accommodating the needs of dis-
abled individuals, which all employers covered by the ADA are
required to do, the PDA requires that employer to apply the same
policy to women disabled by pregnancy."'
99. Cf. Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1992) (employer's refusal to assign
pregnant police officer to light duty violates Title VII because other officers with tempo-
rary non-work related disabilities assigned to light duty).
100. There are, of course, limitations on the employer's obligation to provide accom-
modations to individuals with disabilities. An employer probably is not, for example,
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The legislative history of the PDA supports this view. The
Senate Report provides:
Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered em-
ployment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual
effects of that condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women
who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same con-
ditions as other employees; and when they are not able to work for
medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave
privileges and other benefits, as other workers who are disabled
from working.1
The House Report is even more specific regarding employer's
obligations to accommodate:
The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the
same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work.
The "same treatment" may include employer practices of
transferring workers to lighter assignments, requiring employees
to be examined by company doctors or other practices, so long as
the requirements and benefits are administered equally for all
workers in terms of their actual ability to perform work. 2
Both the House Report and the Senate Report referred favor-
ably to the EEOC regulations in effect at that time requiring em-
ployers to treat disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy
or related medical conditions as all other temporary disabilities. 3
This reference to "temporary" disabilities raises the possibility of an
argument that Congress intended the disabilities associated with
pregnancy to be treated the same as other temporary disabilities,
but would allow employers to treat pregnancy-related disabilities
differently than the long-term disabilities covered by the ADA.
required to restructure a job by reallocating one of its "essential functions" to another
position. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o). The ADA also provides a defense of
undue hardship which relieves the employer of the obligation to accommodate. See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A). For a complete discussion of the steps necessary to establish
discrimination under the ADA, see ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 95.
101. S. REP. NO. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
102. H.R. REP. NO. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1978) [hereinafter HOUSE RE-
PORT].
103. 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (1972).
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There is, however, little support for reading congressional intent in
this way. First, the language of the PDA does not speak in terms of
disabilities at all. Rather, it defines pregnancy discrimination by
comparing the treatment of persons "similar in their ability or in-
ability to work." Second, in discussing the meaning of the PDA,
neither report talks in terms of comparisons with temporarily dis-
abled individuals. Instead, the reports repeatedly refer to compari-
sons with other workers "disabled from work" or "similar in their
ability or inability work." Finally, the current EEOC regulations
define pregnancy discrimination by comparing the disabilities asso-
ciated with pregnancy to "disabilities caused or contributed to by
other medical conditions." 1°4
It might be argued that interpreting the PDA to require em-
ployers to accommodate pregnant women in the same way they
accommodate disabled individuals under the ADA expands the
coverage of the ADA beyond that intended by Congress. Congress,
however, did not expressly exclude pregnancy from ADA coverage.
While it may be difficult in the face of EEOC regulations to the
contrary to establish that the ADA covers pregnancy, no evidence
suggests that Congress intended to foreclose using the PDA to ex-
tend ADA accommodations to pregnant workers.
As to whether Congress intended to impose on employers the
cost of treating pregnancy-related disabilities in the same way as
other disabilities, the Senate Report on the PDA specifically ac-
knowledged the potential costs associated with nondiscriminatory
policies relating to pregnancy. The report concluded, however, that
"even a very high cost could not justify continuation of the policy of
discrimination against pregnant women which has played such a
major part in the pattern of sex discrimination in this country."'
B. Establishing a Right to Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA defines discrimination to include
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1994).
105. SENATE REPORT, supra note 101, at 11.
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can demonstrate that the accommodations would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered enti-
ty .... 1
06
In order to be "otherwise qualified" a disabled individual must be
able, "with or without reasonable accommodation," to "perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.""7 The ADA provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given
to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essen-
tial, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.108
If pregnant women are entitled to the same accommodations
that individuals with disabilities are entitled to under the ADA,
then a woman must first demonstrate that she is able to perform
the essential functions of her job. Women who become pregnant
while working can establish that they are qualified by the fact that
they already were performing the job in question.
If, because of her pregnancy, the woman can no longer perform
some job functions, the first question is whether there are reason-
able accommodations available that will make it possible for her to
perform those job functions. The ADA identifies some of the accom-
modations that would be required for an individual with a disabili-
ty:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include-
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily acces-
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities."9
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
107. Id. § 12111(8).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 12111(9).
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Determining rights under the ADA requires a fact-based, case-
by-case analysis. Any general discussion of the accommodations
that an individual with a disability or a similarly situated pregnant
woman might be entitled to is of limited utility because the particu-
lar circumstances of potential cases are infinitely variable.
Nonetheless, consideration of the accommodations that pregnant
women might be entitled to under the PDA due to the enactment of
the ADA is worthwhile both because the disabilities associated with
pregnancy are predictable and because such consideration provides
a more concrete sense of how the two statutes work together.
Applying the ADA reasonable accommodation provisions to the
disabilities associated with pregnancy means that a pregnant wom-
an whose job requires climbing stairs might be accommodated by
providing access to an elevator. A pregnant woman whose job re-
quires lifting might be provided with a mechanical device or a per-
sonal assistant11 to help her do the lifting. A pregnant woman
whose job requires her to wear a uniform might be provided with a
maternity uniform. A pregnant woman who cannot sit and work
comfortably at a standard desk may require a different work sta-
tion configuration. These accommodations would be mandatory
under the PDA because the ADA requires an employer to provide
these accommodations to an individual with a disability who needs
these accommodations to perform job duties that involve climbing
stairs, lifting, wearing a standard uniform, or working at a desk.
The pregnant woman and the individual with a disability are simi-
lar in their ability or inability to work.
If a pregnant woman is not able to perform some of her job
functions, even with accommodations, the question then becomes
110. The ADA indicates that a reasonable accommodation might include providing a
reader or interpreter. This provision indicates that in some circumstances it is reason-
able to request an accommodation that involves hiring another individual to perform
some of the disabled or pregnant individual's job functions. Of course, those functions
must not be essential functions, but beyond the issue of essential functions, hiring
someone to do a portion of the job would probably not be reasonable unless the cost of
the assistant's services is relatively low and the value of the disabled or pregnant
individual's qualifications and services is relatively high. Consider, for example, a preg-
nant lawyer who, due to pregnancy related back problems, cannot carry heavy books.
Providing a paralegal or library personnel to carry books for her might be a reasonable
accommodation. Similarly, consider a pregnant special education teacher whose primary
responsibility and expertise is teaching children with special needs. Her job might also
require her to lift a child out of a wheelchair. If her pregnancy causes back problems
that make it impossible for her to carry out this job function, providing a teaching aide
to assist her might be reasonable.
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whether the task that she cannot perform is an essential function
of the job. If, for example, a police officer becomes pregnant and can
no longer chase criminals, the question is whether chasing crim-
inals is an essential function of the job. If it is not, then a reason-
able accommodation might include assigning this function to other
officers. For example, on a police force in which some officers work
at a desk as dispatchers and others are assigned to a beat, chasing
criminals might not be an essential function under the ADA be-
cause some officers are not required to chase."' Because an indi-
vidual with a disability that precludes chasing criminals has a right
under the ADA to "light duty" as a dispatcher, the pregnant woman
can argue that, under the PDA, she has the same right. If, howev-
er, chasing criminals is an essential function, neither the employee
with a disability nor the pregnant employee is entitled to job re-
structuring that eliminates that responsibility.
For the pregnant woman whose job requires her to stand or sit
for prolonged periods, arrive on a strict schedule or limit her bath-
room breaks, the question is whether these requirements are essen-
tial functions of the job. If not, the employer must allow some flexi-
bility to make it possible for the woman to perform her essential job
functions.
The ADA also requires employers to make reasonable accom-
modations necessary to provide disabled individuals equal access to
all of the terms, condition, and benefits of the job. For example, an
individual with asthma or AIDS may be able to perform job func-
tions, but because of her disability, workplace hazards such as
smoke, dust, or diseases impair her health. That individual would
be entitled to accommodations designed to reduce her exposure to
smoke, dust, or diseases. For example, the employer might be re-
quired to provide improved ventilation or a protective mask. Simi-
larly, a pregnant woman whose elevated body temperature makes
working in an excessively hot environment intolerable could request
an accommodation such as air conditioning or fans to allow her to
be as comfortable as the rest of the employees. Or a pregnant wom-
an exposed to air-borne toxins in the environment that, because of
her pregnancy, may impair her health, could request similar accom-
modations. If exposure to the hot environment or the airborne tox-
111. See Kuntz v. City of New Haven, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) S 42,766 (D.
Conn. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act case applying principles subsequently adopted in the
ADA), affd, 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994).
1995]
Stetson Law Review
ins is not necessary to perform essential job functions, the disabled
individual or the pregnant woman could also request reassignment
to a more healthful location.
In each of these examples, the pregnant woman and the indi-
vidual with the disability are similar in their ability or inability to
work. Because the disabled individual is entitled to workplace ac-
commodations to preserve his health, the pregnant woman is enti-
tled to the same accommodations under the PDA.
There are, however, some difficulties with securing for preg-
nant women the right to be accommodated in the same way as
disabled individuals covered by the ADA. A pregnant woman who
works at a relatively small company may not be able to produce a
similarly disabled individual (male or female) with whom compari-
sons can be made. This situation ought not to pose significant diffi-
culties as long as the employee can establish that the employer has
a policy of accommodating similarly situated disabled individuals.
Because the ADA imposes an obligation to accommodate, an em-
ployer who is covered by the ADA should not be permitted to allege
that it has no policy concerning accommodation. The employee
would, of course, need to establish that the requested accommoda-
tions would be required under the ADA for an employee whose
disabilities were similar to those experienced during pregnancy.
Another difficulty relates to accommodations required to pro-
tect a pregnant woman's fetus from workplace hazards. Women
have been particularly unsuccessful under the PDA when they have
requested accommodations to protect the life and health of their
unborn children." A pregnant woman may, for example, ask to
be relieved of duties requiring her to be exposed to toxic fumes or
communicable diseases in order to protect the health of her child.
The Supreme Court has ruled that employers are prohibited under
the PDA from preventing fertile and pregnant women from working
in toxic environments."' The Court in Johnson Controls reasoned
that because pregnant women are capable of performing jobs re-
112. See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(pregnant nurse not entitled to be excused from treating HIV patient to protect unborn
child), affd, 33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Detroit-Macomb Hosp. Ctr., Nos.
91-1088 & 91-1278, 1992 WL 6099 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1992) (pregnant nurse's aide not
entitled to be excused from entering isolation rooms to protect her unborn child); Frank
v. Toledo Hosp., 617 N.E.2d 774, 778-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)) (pregnant employee not
entitled to be excused from Rubella vaccination to protect her unborn child).
113. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); see supra
notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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quiring exposure to toxic chemicals, they must be permitted to
perform those jobs just like any other employee who is similarly
able to perform the work." The danger to the fetus in no way im-
pairs the woman's ability to perform the work.
Johnson Controls held that a pregnant employee has a right to
work in a toxic environment if she so chooses." It says nothing
about whether she has a right to be excused from working in a
toxic or diseased environment. The reasoning in Johnson Controls
does, however, create a problem with respect to analyzing pregnan-
cy accommodation cases by looking at the employer's treatment of
workers similar in their ability or inability to work. Johnson Con-
trols makes it clear that fetal health does not relate to ability to
perform a job. Pregnant women, therefore, are entitled under the
PDA to be treated the same as any other employee who is capable
of, for example, producing lead batteries or treating contagious
patients. If other employees are required to work in the toxic or
diseased environment, the pregnant employee who is not accom-
modated has no basis for claiming discriminatory treatment.
The question is whether any accommodations mandated by the
ADA make it possible for a woman to argue under the PDA that
she is entitled to accommodations designed to protect her offspring
from harm. As previously discussed, the fetus can be harmed if,
during pregnancy, its mother engages in heavy physical labor;
works a swing shift, evening shift or night shift; or works in an
environment in which there are toxins, diseases, vibration or
noise."' In addition, the fetus requires good prenatal care, includ-
ing regular visits to the doctor.
The easiest approach to securing accommodations to protect a
woman's child is to assert that the accommodations are necessary
to protect the woman's health. As mentioned earlier, heavy physical
labor and air-borne and other toxins are harmful, not only to the
fetus, but to the pregnant woman herself." Similarly, pregnant
women require prenatal doctors' visits to protect both their own
health and the health of their offspring. If the ADA requires accom-
modations for individuals with disabilities who cannot perform
physical labor or whose disabilities make them sensitive to toxins
or who require frequent doctors' visits, then pregnant women who
114. 499 U.S. at 206.
115. Id.
116. See supra part II.B.
117. See supra part I.
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are similar in their ability to work and who require similar relief
should, under the PDA, be entitled to the same accommodations.
Thus, for example, although pregnant employees at Johnson Con-
trols cannot be excluded from jobs involving exposure to lead,"5
they may be entitled to a lead-free environment as an accommoda-
tion if Johnson Controls has a policy, as required by the ADA, of
accommodating employees with disabilities that make them partic-
ularly sensitive to lead poisoning.
Some situations involving fetal hazards, however, cannot be
handled this way. The fetus can be harmed by contagious diseases,
toxins, shift work, vibrations, and noise that do not impair the
health of a woman because she is pregnant. There are individuals
with disabilities who need accommodations relating to these
workplace hazards. For example, an individual who has AIDS is
extremely susceptible to contagious diseases which can be life-
threatening because of the individual's compromised immune sys-
tem. Employees who have AIDS may be entitled to accommodations
designed to protect them from infectious diseases in the workplace.
Such accommodations might include a protective mask or reassign-
ment to a position in a more healthful environment. The question is
whether the availability of accommodations for an AIDS victim
entitles a pregnant woman to similar accommodations to protect
her developing fetus. It could be argued that the employee with
AIDS and the pregnant employee are similar in their ability or
inability to work and, therefore, both are entitled to accommoda-
tions necessary to preserve their health. An employer might re-
spond, however, that because accommodations are provided only to
preserve the health of the employee there is no disparate treatment
if pregnant women are denied accommodations to protect their
offspring. Again, the easiest way to support accommodations that
protect the fetus is to rely on evidence that the workplace hazard in
question is harmful to the health of the pregnant woman herself.
C. Undue Hardship
The "reasonable accommodation" provision of the ADA defines
the employer's obligation and provides a defense if the employer
118. If Johnson Controls adopted a policy prohibiting all employees with a sensitivi-
ty to lead from working in jobs involving exposure to lead, the employer could exclude
pregnant women from those jobs without violating Title VII. The problem with Johnson
Controls' policy is that only fertile women were excluded.
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"can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the [employer's] business.... ."' The
availability of this defense adds an additional hurdle that must be
cleared before pregnant women are entitled to accommodations in
the workplace. In order to qualify for accommodations, the woman
must be able to perform essential functions of the job, the requested
accommodation must be reasonable, and the accommodation must
not impose an undue hardship on the employer's business.
The undue hardship defense overlaps significantly with the
ADA's requirement that accommodations be "reasonable." The
availability of this defense, however, underscores congressional
intent in enacting the ADA not to impose burdensome costs on
employers. In this respect, the ADA is quite different from Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Title VII does not have a
cost defense to intentional discrimination. As noted previously,
Congress, in enacting the PDA, acknowledged the costs associated
with employing pregnant women and indicated that such costs
should not justify discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. If, how-
ever, the PDA is interpreted to provide pregnant women with the
same rights available to individuals with disabilities under the
ADA, cost becomes relevant. The PDA grants pregnant women the
right to be treated as well as other employees similar in their abili-
ty or inability to work. If individuals with disabilities are not enti-
tled to accommodations because they are too costly, then pregnant
women may be denied that accommodation.
V. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
A. Disparate Impact Under the PDA
Pregnant workers seeking accommodation of their pregnancy
related disabilities may be confronted with facially neutral work
rules prohibiting the requested accommodation. If the employer
applies its facially neutral rules in a discriminatory manner
disfavoring pregnant employees, that will constitute disparate
treatment and a violation of the PDA. Many work rules, even if
facially neutral and applied equally to all employees have a dispa-
rate impact on pregnant workers. For example, a work rule compel-
ling all employees to perform all components of a job requiring
physical exertion or face dismissal probably will have a disparate
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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impact on pregnant employees.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides a statutory basis for the
judicially-created theory of disparate impact discrimination. One of
the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "to confirm
statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudi-
cation of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."" ° Most courts applying the PDA have found dispa-
rate impact analysis applicable 2 and congressional recognition of
disparate impact in the 1991 Civil Rights Act made no exceptions
for cases alleging pregnancy discrimination. Nonetheless, some
courts interpret the PDA to prohibit disparate treatment only.'22
If disparate impact claims are available under the PDA, pregnant
workers seeking accommodation are entitled to accommodation if a
rule prohibiting the requested accommodation has a disparate im-
pact on women or pregnant women.
Courts declining to extend disparate impact analysis to preg-
nancy discrimination rely primarily on the language of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act' and statements in the legislative his-
tory of the Act suggesting that neutral rules that foreclose certain
benefits to both pregnant and other disabled employees are per-
missible under the PDA. For example, the House Report states that
the PDA in no way requires the institution of any new programs
120. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(3), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
121. See Maganuco v. Leyden Community High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 445
(7th Cir. 1991) (disparate impact claim available under PDA); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (disparate impact available but employer's rule
prohibiting employment of unmarried staff who become or cause pregnancy is justified
under the business necessity defense); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543
(11th Cir. 1984) (fetal protection policy challenged under disparate impact theory);
Abraham v. Graphic Arts Intl Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ten-day limit on
temporary disabilities could violate Title VII because of its disparate impact on pregnant
women); Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(disparate impact claim available under PDA); EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F.
Supp. 647 (N.D. ill. 1991) (company policy of discharging all first-year employees who re-
quired long-term sick leave violates PDA because of its disparate impact on women); and
Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981)
(disparate impact claim available under PDA), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 685
F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
122. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (disparate
impact not available under PDA); Connors v. University of Tenn. Press, 558 F. Supp. 38,
41 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (disparate impact not available under PDA); and Brown-Weathersby
v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, No. 82-C-2351 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1983).
123. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) ("women affected by pregnancy... shall be treated the
same ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work").
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where none currently exist and will not require an employer who
does not provide disability benefits or paid sick leave to other em-
ployees to provide them for pregnant workers.'
Despite the language of the amendment and these statements
in the legislative history, the majority of courts addressing this
issue have correctly concluded that disparate impact analysis is
available under the PDA. 1 5 First, the legislative history of the
PDA repeatedly indicates that this amendment is designed merely
to define pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination
and to provide the full range of Title VII protection to discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy. For example, the Senate Report
provides:
This bill is intended to make plain that, under title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, discrimination based on pregnancy, child-
birth, and related medical conditions is discrimination based on
sex. Thus, the bill defines sex discrimination, as proscribed in the
existing statute, to include these physiological occurrences peculiar
to women; it does not change the application of title VII to sex
discrimination in any other way."
Similarly, the House Report states: "As an amendment to Title VII,
this bill will apply to all aspects of employment... currently cov-
ered by Title VI. Pregnancy-based distinctions will be subject to the
same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimination
proscribed in the existing statute."' Both the Senate and the
House Reports on the PDA suggest that Congress contemplated the
application of ordinary Title VII principles, including disparate
impact, to pregnancy discrimination cases.
In the House Report, Congress expressly acknowledged the
continued viability of disparate impact claims in pregnancy discrim-
ination cases. The House Report, in the course of discussing the
PDA as a response to the Supreme Court's treatment of pregnancy
discrimination, stated: "By making clear that distinctions based on
pregnancy are per se violations of title VII, the bill would eliminate
the need in most instances to rely on the impact approach...
124. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 4-5.
125. See supra note 121 for a list of cases applying disparate impact analysis.
126. SENATE REPORT, supra note 101, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
127. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 4 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 3 (second emphasis added).
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Clearly, Congress understood that in some instances disparate
impact theory would be necessary to establish a violation of the
statute.
Finally, the PDA was enacted in response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert' which held that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in providing disability
benefits is not discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court in
Gilbert acknowledged the availability of disparate impact analysis
in a pregnancy discrimination case,' but ruled against the plain-
tiffs because they failed to prove impact. In a subsequent case,
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,"3' the Court applied disparate impact
analysis to find liability in a case in which women on pregnancy
disability leave lost accumulated seniority. The Court distinguished
Gilbert on the ground that the plaintiffs in Gilbert sought to secure
a benefit that other employees did not have, while the neutral rule
in Satty imposed a burden on women that other employees were not
required to bear. Therefore, prior to the PDA, the Supreme Court
interpreted Title VII to prohibit neutral rules that have a disparate
impact on women because women get pregnant.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the PDA to sug-
gest that, in expanding women's rights under Title VII, Congress
intended to restrict them at the same time by foreclosing disparate
impact claims in pregnancy discrimination cases. In fact, the House
Report, while discussing the effective date of the amendment, ac-
knowledged the continued viability of the impact approach applied
in Satty: "Section 2(a) provides for an immediate effective date
insofar as the bill affects employment policies other than fringe
benefits .... Many, if not all such policies, are presumably invalid
under present law as interpreted in Satty."'32
Disparate impact analysis can be used to resolve many of the
accommodation problems faced by pregnant women. If, for example,
an employer does not permit employees with medical needs to take
leave, request light duty, take bathroom breaks, or work a flexible
schedule, a pregnant woman may be able to challenge that policy
on the ground that it has a disparate impact on women. This ap-
129. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
130. Id. at 137. All of the Justices in Gilbert agreed with the majority on this point.
See id. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id.
at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting); and id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
132. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 8.
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proach was taken by the court in EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co.'33
In Warshawsky, the court, applying disparate impact analysis,
found that the company's policy of discharging all first-year employ-
ees who requested long-term sick leave discriminated against preg-
nant women in violation of the PDA.134
B. Proving Disparate Impact on the Basis of Pregnancy
Concluding that disparate impact analysis is applicable in
pregnancy discrimination cases creates an issue which was central
to the dispute in Warshawsky - how to define the groups to deter-
mine whether a neutral policy has an impact. In Warshawsky, the
EEOC compared "the percent of pregnant first-year employees who
were discharged because of the policy (95.2% - all except one) and
the percent of all non-pregnant first-year employees who were dis-
charged because of the policy (1.8%).... "135 The company de-
scribed the protected group as "all pregnant first-year employees
who required sick leave [95.2% fired] and the non-protected group
as all non-pregnant first-year employees who required sick leave
[100% fired]... "136 The Warshawsky court asserted that the ap-
propriate analysis is "the traditional 'sex discrimination' analy-
sis." 7 The court then compared the percentage of female first-
year employees fired (50 out of 1,105 or 4.5%) with the percentage
of male first-year employees fired (3 out of 773 or .4%). The court
applied the eighty percent rule and concluded that this comparison
demonstrated disparate impact because "[i]f the likelihood of being
fired for a male were 80% of the likelihood of being fired for a fe-
male... only 5 to 6 women would have been fired instead of50.,,W38
The court's measure of disparate impact in Warshawsky makes
sense if the appropriate legal question is whether a neutral policy
has a disparate impact on the women who work at a particular
company. Why should women be the appropriate group rather than
pregnant women? If the appropriate comparison is between preg-
nant women and non-pregnant people disparate impact will always
be shown. For example, if an employer does not provide light duty
133. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. l. 1991).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 651.
136. Id. at 652.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 654-55.
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for individuals with a medically provable need and a comparison is
drawn between pregnant women and non-pregnant people, nearly
one hundred percent of the pregnant women will be impacted com-
pared with the portion of non-pregnant workers who have medical
restrictions on physical activity. While it is difficult to argue that
Congress intended to foreclose the traditional sex discrimination
impact analysis applied by the court in Warshawsky, it is unlikely
that the PDA was designed to create an impact claim every time a
neutral rule operates to the disadvantage of pregnant women.
Another question raised by Warshawsky concerning comparison
groups is why the impact within a particular workforce should be
the appropriate measure. Taking this approach means that a policy
which violates the PDA at one company might be permissible if
applied at a company where the entry level employees -re substan-
tially older. Eleven percent of women aged twenty to twenty-nine
give birth each year while only 0.4% of women aged forty to forty-
four give birth each year. If pregnancy is the primary reason why a
neutral employment policy has a disparate impact on female em-
ployees, it probably will not have an impact if most of the female
employees are middle aged.
An alternative approach would be to consider the impact of a
particular policy on women in the workforce in general rather than
women working at a particular company. This approach is likely to
generate a disparate impact on women for any policy that denies to
all employees accommodations relating to illness or injury. Data
based on a National Health Interview Survey conducted by the U.S.
National Center for Health Statistics produced Table 3, which
shows that women, as a group, consistently suffer more days of
illness or injury than men.139 The difference is likely due to the
fact that women get pregnant. If an employer restricts sick days or
days that an employee can arrive late or leave early due to illness,
such policies are likely to have a disparate impact on women be-
cause, as a group, they require more disability days. Perhaps it can
also be inferred from this information that women more than men
will need other workplace accommodations relating to disability,
such as light duty and flexible breaks. Therefore, neutral rules
denying such accommodations to all employees may have a dispa-
rate impact on female employees.
However, carrying this argument to its logical conclusion sug-
139. See infra note 144.
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gests that it proves too much. Consider the employer who provides
no medical benefits for employees. If women are disabled by illness
and injury more often than men, it could be argued that refusing to
provide medical benefits has a disparate impact on women. The
disparate impact is probably the result of female pregnancy. It is,
however, nearly impossible to argue that Congress intended this
result when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Recon-
sider the legislative history of the PDA presented previously.'
The history of the PDA clearly states that the PDA is not intended
to force employers to provide medical benefits to pregnant women
unless such benefits were already available to other employees.
More recently, Congress and the Clinton Administration fiercely
debated requiring employers to provide medical benefits to employ-
ees. A new statute imposing this obligation would be unnecessary if
disparate impact analysis under the PDA already required employ-
ers to provide medical benefits.
If Congress did not intend to force employers to subsidize the
medical expenses of pregnancy, does this mean that disparate im-
pact analysis is not available under the PDA? Not necessarily. The
Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Choate," while recognizing the
availability of impact analysis under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,14' nonetheless declined to apply impact analysis
to prohibit a fourteen-day limitation on in-patient coverage being
challenged which would not "deny respondents meaningful access
to... Medicaid services or exclude them from those services."'
Choate suggests that it is possible for disparate impact to be gener-
ally applicable without applying in all circumstances. In this case,
while there is no evidence that Congress intended to exclude all
impact claims relating to pregnancy, it is clear that this particular
variety of impact claim was not intended.
140. See supra part IM.
141. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
142. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
143. 469 U.S. at 302.
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TABLE 344
ITEM DAYS OF DISABILITY PER PERSON
1970 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990
Restricted-activity days 45 14.6 19.1 14.8 14.7 15.2 14.9
Male 13.2 17.1 12.8 12.7 13.2 13.1
Female 15.8 21.0 16.6 16.5 17.0 16.7
Bed-disability days'4 6 6.1 7.0 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.2
Male 5.2 5.9 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.2
Female 6.9 8.0 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.1
Work-loss days' 47  5.4 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.3
Male 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 4.7
Female 5.9 5.1 6.0 5.8 6.4 5.9
Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital and Health Statistics, series 1 No.
181; and unpublished data.
Finally, disparate impact theory also is problematic as a basis
for providing women with a right to accommodations designed to
protect fetal health. If the employer does not offer any employee the
option of avoiding toxins or contagious diseases in the workplace,
what is the disparate impact on pregnant women? The pregnant
woman, like all other employees, is faced with a difficult choice.
The choice may be more difficult than for other employees, but it is
144. Table 3 is based on Table No. 199, entitled Days of Disability, by Type and
Selected Characteristics: 1970 to 1990, in THE HEALTH AND NUTRITION SECTION of the
1993 STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT. CENsus BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COAMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 132 (113th ed. 1994).
145. "A day when a person cuts down on his activities for more than half a day
because of illness or injury. Includes bed-disability, work-loss, and school-loss days." See
supra note 144, at 132 n.1.
146. "A day when a person stayed in bed more than half a day because of illness or
injury. Includes those work-loss and school-loss days actually spent in bed." See supra
note 144, at 132 n.4.
147. A work-loss day is:
A day when a person lost more than half a workday because of illness or inju-
ry. Computed for persons 17 years of age and over (beginning 1985, 18 years of
age and over) in the currently employed population, defined as those who were
working or had a job or business from which they were not on layoff during
the 2-week period preceding the week of interview.
See supra note 144, at 132 n.5.
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nonetheless a choice. If she loses her job it is because she exercised
a choice, not because the employer forced her to leave. In order to
find disparate impact a court would have to be willing to recognize
that imposing a choice between a job and a child's health is a differ-
ent term and condition of employment than imposing a choice be-
tween a job and the employee's own health. The court in Armstrong
v. Flowers Hospital, Inc.' was unwilling to characterize the more
difficult choice as a cognizable variety of impact.
C. Business Necessity
Establishing that an employer's neutral rule has a disparate
impact on pregnant employees is, of course, only the first step to-
wards establishing liability under Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act
require the employer to bear the burden of proving that a neutral
employment practice with a disparate impact is "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity."'
The wording of this provision seems to suggest that cost alone will
not satisfy the employer's burden absent a showing that the chal-
lenged rule is job related. This language is useful for pregnant
women seeking to establish that neutral rules prohibiting
workplace accommodations violate Title VII because employers will
be required to establish not only that the challenged rule is effi-
cient, but that it is job related. For example, an employer who will
not permit a woman who is nauseous during the first few months of
pregnancy to work on a flexible schedule will need to demonstrate
that a fixed schedule is related to her job. This may be difficult
when the job in question is a professional position that can be per-
formed at any time. Similarly, while refusing to grant any sick
leave in the first year may save money, the employer may have
difficulty establishing that attendance every single working day is
an essential job function.
Plaintiffs can also make out a discrimination case by establish-
ing the availability of an alternative employment practice that will
serve the employer's needs with less impact. If, for example, the
employer assigns light duty by seniority, rather than on the basis of
need, an employee could assert that light duty allocated on the
basis of need, first come, first served, would get all the necessary
148. 812 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
149. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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jobs done without the adverse impact on women caused by the se-
niority system. The same could be said for assigning employees to
the day shift. With respect to bathroom and eating breaks, an em-
ployee could suggest numerous short breaks in place of one long
lunch break as an alternative policy designed to accommodate the
needs of pregnant women.
V1. ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT OF 1993
Some of the accommodation problems faced by pregnant women
are addressed by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA). ' The FMLA requires employers to provide up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave for a variety of purposes, including the birth
or adoption of a child. 5' The Department of Labor (DOL) recog-
nizes that circumstances may require that FMLA leave for the birth
of a child, or for placement for adoption or foster care, be taken
prior to the actual birth or placement.'52 The DOL has indicated,
however, that "[an employee's entitlement to [FMLA] leave for
birth or placement [of a child] expires at the end of the 12-month
period [after the] birth or placement." 3
The FMLA reduces, but by no means eliminates, the impor-
tance of the PDA for pregnant workers. While it provides an explic-
it right to one type of accommodation, it does not address other ac-
commodations that a pregnant employee might need. Further, be-
cause the leave that it requires is unpaid, it does little to address
the problems faced by single pregnant mothers. A single pregnant
woman working in a job that is hazardous to her health or to the
health of her offspring must decide whether to leave work without
pay during part of her pregnancy to try to avoid harm to herself or
her offspring or to take the leave after the birth of the child so that
she can stay home and nurse and care for the baby. Even if she
takes the entire twelve weeks during pregnancy, that may not be a
sufficient amount of time to protect both her health and the health
of her offspring. Her offspring is most at risk from some workplace
hazards during the first three months of pregnancy.
150. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. V
1993)).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 2612; see generally Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule;
Request for Comments, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (1993).
152. 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(c), (d) (1994).
153. Id. § 825.201.
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The hazards associated with the mother's health, however, tend
to be concentrated in the last three months of pregnancy. In any
case, the leave is without pay, forcing the single pregnant woman to
turn to state aid for support. Further, the FMLA applies only to
employers with fifty or more employees."
Because of these coverage limitations, part-time employees,
first-year employees, and employees who work for small employers
are among those who are not entitled to leave under the FMLA.
The exclusion of small employers is particularly important because,
"according to one [EEOC] official, [pregnancy discrimination claims]
are often against small firms whose policies may be more
'paternalistic' than those of major corporations." 55
V17. ADVISING EMPLOYERS
Employers who prefer to avoid the costs of accommodating the
needs of pregnant women should be aware that this approach is not
cost-free. Although employers have been reasonably successful in
defending against pregnancy discrimination lawsuits,'56 expecta-
tions raised by the accommodation of workers under the ADA may
lead to increased litigation on this issue. Furthermore, the interac-
tion between the ADA, the FMLA, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
the PDA may lead to more success in the courtroom for pregnant
females who sue. In some jurisdictions, state law requires employ-
ers to provide some workplace accommodation.'57
With respect to accommodations designed to protect the unborn
children of pregnant workers, absent further legislation, employers
have a somewhat better chance of defending their right to resist
such accommodations. There may, however, be pragmatic reasons
154. The Department of Labor uses the following criteria to determine which em-
ployees are eligible to take leave under the FMLA
To be "eligible," an employee must have worked for the employer: (1) For at
least 12 months and (2) for at least 1,250 hours during the year preceding the
start of the leave, and (3) be employed at a worksite where the employer em-
ploys at least 50 employees within a 75-mile radius....
It is conceivable that a covered employer, employing more than 50 employ-
ees at multiple, geographically dispersed worksites, might have no eligible em-
ployees if fewer than 50 employees are working within 75 miles of each
worksite.
58 Fed. Reg. 31,798 (1993).
155. Complaints of Pregnancy Discrimination Persist Thirteen Years After Passage of
Pregnancy Bias Act, 137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 331 (July 15, 1991).
156. See supra part III.
157. See statutes cited supra note 7.
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why employers should consider granting such requests. The PDA,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Johnson Controls, prohibits
employers from barring pregnant women from toxic environments.
Employers seeking to limit liability for damages to the unborn
children of their pregnant workers, may wish to secure that protec-
tion by granting women the right to be reassigned away from dan-
gerous environments during their pregnancy."8 Many pregnant
workers when faced with the choice of losing their job or exposing
their unborn child to risks will choose to leave their job. A policy of
not accommodating women in this respect will therefore protect the
employer to some degree from tort lawsuits. Prior caselaw suggests
that a lawsuit by the discharged pregnant female under the PDA is
unlikely to succeed as well. However, the best approach for the
employer may be to allow the accommodation. First, this approach
protects the employer from defending against a PDA lawsuit by a
discharged female. Second, more women are likely to accept volun-
tary reassignment than the complete loss of their job, thus reducing
the employer's exposure to tort suits over fetal harm.
Finally, employers may be concerned that by accommodating
the needs of pregnant employees they may face reverse discrimina-
tion lawsuits by other employees who are not similarly accommo-
dated. The most obvious way to protect against such lawsuits is to
provide the same accommodations to individuals who are disabled
in the same way that pregnant women are disabled. But if the work
environment makes it very costly to accommodate all employees in
the same way, employers should be aware that the Supreme Court,
in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra,59 in-
dicated that preferential treatment of pregnant individuals proba-
bly does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The Court
stated:
[We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress
intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy disabili-
ty benefits may not drop - not a ceiling above which they may
not rise."
It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively
158. See Susan S. Grover, Employer's Fetal Injury Quandary After Johnson Controls,
81 KY. L.J. 639 (1993) (discussing employers' limited options to avoid both tort and
discrimination liability after Johnson Controls).
159. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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discussed only its intent not to require preferential treatment if in
fact it had intended to prohibit such treatment.1"
Again, the safest approach is to accommodate all similarly situated
employees equally, but the Court in Guerra appears to permit em-
ployers to voluntarily accommodate the needs of pregnant employ-
ees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Failing to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace exposes
seventeen to twenty percent of all pregnant women each year to
health hazards including back injuries, muscle fatigue, falls, torn
ligaments, strained muscles, swollen ankles, varicose veins, nausea,
toxic substances, and general discomfort. Failing to accommodate
pregnancy in the workplace exposes pregnant workers unborn off-
spring to workplace health hazards, including exposure to ionizing
radiation, infection, toxic gases and solvents, and low birth weight
due to physical stress. Single women who choose to avoid those
hazards by leaving their employment face a high probability of
living in poverty and exposing their children to inadequate prenatal
care, poor nutrition, substandard shelter, health care and educa-
tional resources, drugs, crime, toxic chemicals, and pollution. Near-
ly thirty percent of pregnant women are either unmarried or sepa-
rated.
A variety of legislative responses are available to address the
problems posed by workplace hazards and single parenthood. Un-
less and until additional legislation is enacted, accommodating
pregnancy in the workplace is one approach to improving the
health of pregnant workers and their offspring and improving the
employment opportunities of single pregnant women.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act together with the Americans
with Disabilities Act should be interpreted to require employers to
accommodate pregnancy in the workplace. Employers should be
required to accommodate pregnant women in the same way that
the ADA requires employers to accommodate individuals with dis-
abilities. In addition, disparate impact analysis should be applied
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to prohibit employers from
applying neutral employment rules that preclude accommodating
pregnancy in the workplace. Statistics demonstrate that women, as
160. Id. at 285-87 (emphasis added).
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a group, consistently suffer more days of illness or injury on the job
than men. As a result, workplace rules that preclude accommodat-
ing pregnancy can be shown to have a disparate impact on women.
Accommodating pregnancy in the workplace implicates
women's equal employment rights, but the policy justifications for
imposing an obligation to accommodate pregnancy are not primarily
based on equal employment opportunities for women. Pregnancy
should be accommodated to promote the health and welfare of de-
veloping offspring and the children of pregnant single females.
